Aug. 16, 2024  
Jonathan Brater, Director of Elections  
Michigan Bureau of Elections  
430 W. Allegan St.  
Richard H. Austin Building - 1st Floor  
Lansing, MI 48918  
Dear Director Brater,  
This letter will also be submitted as written testimony for the Aug. 16 public hearing on the Bureau  
of Elections rule set, 2024-019 ST.  
There are many concerns with the broad-brushed rewrites in this rule set. However, the most  
egregious concern is that the department has stepped outside its rulemaking authority to insert  
language that is contrary to current state law and instead mimics policies spelled out in the yet  
ineffective Senate Bill 603, now Public Act 74 of 2024.  
Under the current law – the law under effect through the end of this year – absent voter ballots can  
be recounted if the said ballots are “securely packaged and sealed.”  
That is the current law. It’s unambiguous. However, this proposed rule set ignores this current clear  
language of the law and utilizes new language from SB 603, which will not be in effect until next  
year. Instead, this proposed rule set says that it is up to the secretary of state to decide what a  
satisfactory explanation is in determining if the “security of the ballots has been preserved.” This  
rule set is not implementing current law but is, in fact, a complete rewrite of the law. The Michigan  
Constitution is clear that the Legislature is the only branch of government with the authority to pass  
legislation.  
Michigan Election Law, Sec. 168.871  
(2) This section does not prohibit the recounting of absent voter ballots tallied in a  
precinct using an absent voter counting board or in a precinct in which 1 or more  
voting machines are recountable, if the absent voter ballots are securely packaged and  
sealed.  
On page 50 of the proposed rule set, subsections (3) and (4) do not reflect current statute and instead  
are policies taken from SB 603/PA 74, particularly those on pages 26 and 27, subsection (2).  
R 168.793 Recount, page 50, sections (3) and (4)  
“(3) A recount may still be conducted even if the precinct does not satisfy the conditions  
under subrule (1) of this rule if there is a satisfactory explanation in a sworn affidavit  
provided by an election inspector, a clerk, or a member of the clerk’s staff to the board  
of canvassers demonstrating that the security of the ballots has been preserved.  
(4) An explanation is satisfactory if it documents that the security of the ballots is  
otherwise preserved and the board of canvassers determines that it meets the  
requirements set forth in instructions issued by the secretary of state in determining  
whether an explanation is satisfactory.”  
Senate Bill 603, H-2, Sec. 871, Pages 26 and 27, section (2),  
“If a board of canvassers conducting a recount under this chapter determines that the  
ballots of a precinct are not eligible for recount under subsection (1) (a) or (b), the board  
of canvassers conducting that recount may still conduct the recount if a satisfactory  
explanation in a form of a sworn affidavit, in a form as prescribed by the secretary of  
state, is provided by an election inspector, a clerk, or a member of the clerk’s staff to the  
board of canvassers. An explanation must not be accepted by a board of canvassers as  
satisfactory unless the explanation documents that the security of the ballots is otherwise  
preserved. The secretary of state shall prepare and issue instructions for a board of  
canvassers to follow when determining if an explanation in a sworn affidavit is  
satisfactory under this subsection.”  
Both of these sections reference alternative means for election officials to initiate a recount and  
require the official to provide a sworn affidavit with a satisfactory explanation that the security of  
the ballots has been preserved. Both sections also reference guidelines that will be disseminated by  
the secretary of state that describe what explanations would be considered satisfactory.  
Since SB 603/PA 74 did not receive immediate effect when passed by the Legislature, it will not be  
effective law until 90 days after the legislative session ends. We contend that administrative rules  
can only effectuate policies that are effective in state law, meaning the aforementioned subsections  
of rule set 2024-019 ST cannot be made effective until after SB 603/PA 74 takes effect.  
In light of these concerns, I oppose the Bureau of Elections rule set, 2024-019 ST.  
Sincerely,  
Sen. Jim Runestad  
District 23  
From:  
To:  
Sheree Ritchie  
MDOS-Elections-PublicComment  
Cc:  
Dee Davey  
Subject:  
Date:  
Public Hearing - Testimony Friday August 16 2024 RE Rule Set 2024-19 ST  
Friday, August 16, 2024 4:34:20 PM  
CAUTION: This is an External email. Please send suspicious emails to  
[email protected]  
Elections & Campaign Finance - Administrative Rules for Electronic Voting Systems, Rule Set  
2024-19 ST  
Public Hearing  
To Whom It May Concern:  
Scio Township, MI  
On Saturday, July 27, 2024, and on Wednesday, July 31, 2024, there occurred statewide  
outages of the Electronic Poll Book upon polls opening. Observed in person by Dee Davey,  
election inspector, Ms. Davey's comments are as follows, which Ms. Davey reported in writing  
to the SCIO Township Clerk, Jessica Flintoft, and Scio Township Deputy Clerk Barbara Calleja:  
"EPB Outages Saturday & Wednesday. This is the elephant in the room. I experienced these  
two outages, have heard & read about this in the press, and heard there was a 'fix', however  
whenever voting equipment is tied to the internet there are serious security risks. Citizens are  
concerned, with due cause, that our early voting processes are dependent on CrowdStrike  
[cybersecurity] and 'real-time internet connection and data transfer.' I have also heard of  
recent EPB outages due to CrowdStrike in other states, [namely] Ohio and AZ. This should  
raise alarm bells with everyone, particularly our election officials who we trust and rely on for  
the administration of our elections. The seriousness of internet-connected vulnerabilities,  
coupled with the recent CrowdStrike national issues, I believe warrant an independent  
investigation into the causes and remedies to ensure safe and secure elections, and I am  
hopeful that you will agree."  
Quoted remarks above written by Ms. Dee Davey, and read aloud at the August 16, 2024,  
Public Hearing by Sheree Ritchie, representing Pure Integrity Michigan Elections; Michigan Fair  
Elections; Stand Up Michigan; The Freedom Alliance; and Mid-Michigan Women for  
Conservative Values - these organizations combined encompass more than 300,000 Michigan  
citizens.  
Respectfully submitted,  
Sheree Ritchie  
1206 Brookside Drive, Lansing MI 48917  
517-303-3125  
[email protected]  
CC: Dee Davey  
8849 Brookville Road, Plymouth, MI 48170  
734-233-1513  
[email protected]  
From:  
Patrick Colbeck  
To:  
MDOS-Elections-PublicComment  
Subject:  
Date:  
Electronic Copy of Comments Made During August 16, 2024 Public Hearing  
Friday, August 16, 2024 12:01:36 PM  
Attachments:  
MI SoS Electronic Voting System Rules.docx  
Public Testimony of Patrick Colbeck Regarding Proposed MDOS Rules on Electronic Voting Systems.docx  
CAUTION: This is an External email. Please send suspicious emails to  
abuse@michigan.gov  
I have attached electronic copies the testimony that I provided at the August 16, 2024 MDOS Public  
Hearing pertaining to MDOS newly proposed rules for electronic voting systems.  
An electronic copy of the report associated with my testimony is provided for your reference as well.  
Should you have any questions regarding the proposed revisions to your ruleset, you can reach me at  
this email address.  
Regards,  
Patrick Colbeck  
President, MI Grassroots Alliance  
Public Testimony of Patrick Colbeck Regarding Proposed MDOS Rules on Electronic Voting Systems  
My name is Patrick Colbeck. I am a former MI State Senator for the citizens of the 7th State Senate  
District for two terms. During my second term in the Michigan Senate, I served as Vice Chair of the  
Senate Elections and Government Reform committee. Prior to my service in the Michigan Senate, I  
had a successful aerospace engineering and management career supplemented by certification as  
a Microsoft Small Business Specialist. During the 2020 election, I served as a certified poll  
challenger at the TCF Center in Detroit, MI. In short, I have a unique blend of experience with  
Michigan election law and election practices coupled with professional experience with  
information technology.  
Upon receiving notice of the proposed Michigan Department of State rules for Electronic Voting  
Systems which are the topic of discussion for this hearing, I proceeded to conduct a thorough  
review of the proposed rules which I have documented in the 126-page document that I have  
shared with the committee. My review evaluated the compliance of the proposed rules with the  
Michigan Constitution, current Michigan Compiled Law and United States Code. In addition to  
evaluating compliance of the proposed rules with existing law, I evaluated the proposed rules for  
any gaps that needed to be filled in order to ensure the accuracy and integrity of our elections  
based upon my experience.  
During my public testimony, I will proceed to provide a summary of my findings.  
Finding #1: The proposed rules for electronic voting systems have insufficient scope and rigor to  
ensure the accuracy and integrity of our elections as required by our Michigan Constitution.  
Finding #2: The proposed rules appear to be biased towards diminishing the rights of voters and  
local election officials in favor of increased control of elections and election records by the  
Michigan Department of State. Once again, our Michigan Constitution requires that all voting rights  
be liberally construed in favor of voters’ rights in order to effectuate its purpose.  
Finding #3: The Michigan Department of State appears to be engaged in deliberate and repeated  
abuse of the rule -making process to subvert the integrity of our elections  
In support of Finding #1 regarding insufficient rigor to ensure the accuracy and integrity of our  
elections, I submit the following observations:  
In a ruleset specific to electronic voting systems, there is notably zero mention of best practices  
regarding security protocols for electronic systems. There are quite a few references to the use of  
seals to preserve the integrity of physical records such as ballot containers, but zero references to  
their digital record equivalents such as user account, device access or network security protocols.  
In a ruleset specific to electronic voting systems, there is notably zero reference to secure digital  
record transfers for systems designed to connect to the internet as evidenced by election official  
communications, election procedure manuals, contracts between electronic voting system  
vendors, my own personal observations as a Certified Microsoft Small Business Specialist, and  
even the Department of State’s own website where it encourages clerks experiencing difficulties  
with internet connections to contact their friends at Connected Nation.  
In a ruleset specific to electronic voting systems, there are rules pertaining only to the use of two  
components of that system – hand-fed polling location tabulators and voter accessible devices.  
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August 16, 2024  
Public Testimony of Patrick Colbeck Regarding Proposed MDOS Rules on Electronic Voting Systems  
The ruleset ignores any usage guidance for batch-fed tabulators, electronic pollbooks, adjudication  
equipment, vote tally equipment, networking equipment and election night reporting.  
In a ruleset specific to electronic voting systems, the requirement for end-to-end system testing  
replicating how this critical infrastructure performs on election night is prefaced with the words “if  
practicable”. So, we only need to test the full system if it is convenient. It should be noted that the  
7,060 vote flipped experienced in Antrim County would have been detected if end-to-end testing of  
the election day configuration had been performed.  
in a ruleset specific to electronic voting systems, there seems to be an inexplicable focus upon the  
security of physical records NOT digital records.  
In support of Finding #2 regarding a bias against voters’ rights, I submit the following observations:  
Many voters have expressed concerns with the integrity of mail-in voting, yet the ruleset fails to  
provide any substantive guidance on the components integral to the mail-in voting process such as  
batch-fed tabulators, electronic pollbooks, and adjudication equipment.  
Many voters have expressed concerns with the integrity of our voter rolls. Investigators have shared  
evidence of dead voters, people who have moved out of a given jurisdiction, people registered  
illegal addresses such as businesses or apartments without an apartment number, or people who  
are not American citizens – all being listed on our active voter rolls. The July 2024 QVF, which is  
statutorily required to maintain voter history records for a period of not less than 5 years, shows  
that there were 302,380 more ballots cast in 2020 election then there were voters. Against this  
backdrop, the proposed ruleset governing electronic voting systems provides zero substantive  
guidance on the use of electronic pollbooks and the state Qualified Voter File.  
Many voters have expressed concerns with vote tally anomalies, yet the ruleset fails to provide any  
substantive guidance on the components of the vote tally chain of custody including vote tally  
equipment and election night reporting.  
Many voters have expressed concerns with internet connections, yet the ruleset makes zero  
references to network security protocols regarding either official or unofficial record transfers.  
Many voters have expressed concerns with fractional voting, yet the ruleset makes no reference to  
the need for electronic voting systems to store and report vote tally data as integers not fractions.  
Voters are guaranteed the right to an audit of statewide elections to ensure their accuracy and  
integrity. In order to accomplish any such audit, any auditor must be provided with an audit trail  
sufficient to verify the accuracy and integrity of our elections. The startling gaps in the audit trail  
enabled by the proposed ruleset for electronic voting system are either the result of gross  
negligence on the matter of securing a critical system of our nation’s infrastructure or indicate a  
deliberate attempt to enable election fraud.  
In support of Finding #3 regarding a pattern of abuse of the rule-making process, I submit the  
following observations:  
Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson has been found by seven different courts to have  
issued unlawful guidance regarding elections. Seven. During oral testimony on October 3, 2023 in  
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Public Testimony of Patrick Colbeck Regarding Proposed MDOS Rules on Electronic Voting Systems  
the O’Halloran v Benson case before the Michigan Court of Appeals, Department of State lawyer  
Heather Meingast demonstrated her client’s flagrant disregard for the law in the following  
concerning statement:  
“I don’t think we would want to create a war between the branches and if there was something  
telling us to do something and we thought it was OK, we would probably do it. But if … this isn’t  
something that we can really do because we couldn’t really control it or it’s a bad idea we might just  
choose not to do it you could leave that statute sitting there and we could continue to issue  
instructions and give guidance and somebody would probably sue us.”  
Voters were forced to sue her multiple times at their own expense, often AFTER the impact of her  
unlawful guidance was already inflicted upon the conduct of our elections. This blatant disregard  
for the rule of law is concerning. This behavioral pattern underscores the need for a professional  
review of these proposed rules for electronic voting systems BEFORE they go into effect.  
Electronic voting systems are complex. We rely upon the integrity of regulatory bodies to secure  
these complex systems. These regulatory bodies in turn delegate this responsibility to non-  
government organizations with personnel that have the necessary skillsets to evaluate the security  
of such systems. These NGO’s are not subject to any substantive oversight. NGO’s, including  
electronic voting system vendors, are not subject to FOIA requests for example. This oversight is  
made even more problematic by the fact that the contracts between government bodies and  
electronic voting system vendors feature illusory provisions. These illusory provisions prevent  
examination of the design and implementation of these systems by all but a select group of election  
officials. Meanwhile, more and more of our election processes are being ceded to these NGO’s  
because of the complexity of elections featuring electronic voting systems.  
During my aerospace engineering career, I was responsible for designing elements of the  
International Space Station life support system. Since the lives of the Astronauts depended upon  
the effectiveness and integrity of my design for their very lives, my systems were viewed as “critical  
infrastructure”. There was a significant degree of rigor applied to the design, analysis and testing of  
these systems. We conducted rigorous failure modes and effects analyses, conducted rigorous  
component-level and system-level tests based in large part upon these analyses, and enacted  
strict configuration control practices to prevent tampering with the integrity of our flight articles.  
Our election systems have also been designated as critical infrastructure. This proposed ruleset,  
however, does not come anywhere close to the rigor needed to ensure the accuracy and integrity of  
our electronic voting systems. In fact, this proposed ruleset for electronic voting systems does not  
come close to providing the level of security evident in the regulations for children toys much less  
what is needed for an element of our nation’s critical infrastructure. We need to do better. The  
126-page report that I submit to you today is my attempt to assist the Michigan Department of State  
achieve its constitutional obligation to ensure the accuracy and integrity of our elections.  
Page | 3  
August 16, 2024  
2024  
Evaluation of Proposed  
Electronic Voting  
System Rules  
AS PROPOSED BY MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON  
JULY 31, 2024  
PREPARED BY  
PATRICK COLBECK  
FORMER MICHIGAN STATE SENATOR  
Evaluation of Proposed Electronic Voting System Rules  
By Patrick Colbeck  
Table of Contents  
1
2
3
Introduction..........................................................................................................................6  
Background ..........................................................................................................................6  
Governing Statutes................................................................................................................8  
3.1  
Referenced Statutes .....................................................................................................8  
3.1.1 MCL 168.31 ..............................................................................................................8  
3.1.2 MCL 168.37 ............................................................................................................10  
3.1.3 MCL 168.794 ..........................................................................................................11  
3.1.4 MCL 168.794c ........................................................................................................11  
3.1.5 MCL 168.797b ........................................................................................................12  
3.1.6 MCL 168.720c ........................................................................................................12  
3.2  
Additional Applicable Statutes ....................................................................................12  
Rule Adoption Timeline .......................................................................................................13  
Key Definitions....................................................................................................................15  
4
5
5.1  
Election Equipment ....................................................................................................15  
Election Management System.....................................................................................15  
Program .....................................................................................................................15  
Qualified Voter File .....................................................................................................15  
Tabulator....................................................................................................................15  
Voting Station .............................................................................................................15  
5.2  
5.3  
5.4  
5.5  
5.6  
6
Issues with Proposed MDOS Rule Changes ..........................................................................15  
6.1  
R 168.771 Definitions..................................................................................................15  
6.1.1 Ballot .....................................................................................................................15  
6.1.2 Status Report .........................................................................................................16  
6.1.3 Totals Tape .............................................................................................................17  
6.1.4 Voting System.........................................................................................................17  
6.1.5 Pollbook References ...............................................................................................22  
6.1.6 Election Materials...................................................................................................22  
6.1.7 Summary Zero Report .............................................................................................23  
6.1.8 Ballot Summary Page..............................................................................................23  
6.1.9 Adjudication Equipment..........................................................................................24  
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Evaluation of Proposed Electronic Voting System Rules  
By Patrick Colbeck  
6.1.10  
6.1.11  
6.1.12  
6.1.13  
6.1.14  
6.1.15  
6.1.16  
Vote Tally Equipment...........................................................................................24  
Networking Equipment........................................................................................25  
Election Night Reporting......................................................................................25  
Audit ..................................................................................................................25  
Electronic Pollbook Activity Log Report ................................................................25  
Electronic Pollbook Remarks Report....................................................................26  
Electronic Pollbook Voter List Report ...................................................................26  
6.2  
R 168.772 General Provisions......................................................................................26  
6.2.1 Proposed MDOS Rule..............................................................................................26  
6.2.2 Issue(s) ..................................................................................................................27  
6.2.3 Proposed Revision ..................................................................................................28  
6.3  
R 168.773 Preparation of Program ...............................................................................29  
6.3.1 Proposed MDOS Rule..............................................................................................29  
6.3.2 Issue(s) ..................................................................................................................50  
6.3.3 Proposed Revision ..................................................................................................50  
6.4  
R 168.774 Preparation of Ballots..................................................................................71  
6.4.1 Proposed MDOS Rule..............................................................................................71  
6.4.2 Issue(s) ..................................................................................................................73  
6.4.3 Proposed Revision ..................................................................................................74  
6.5  
R 168.775 Preparation of Tabulators ............................................................................76  
6.5.1 Proposed MDOS Rule..............................................................................................76  
6.5.2 Issue(s) ..................................................................................................................77  
6.5.3 Proposed Revision ..................................................................................................78  
6.6  
R 168.776 Preparation of Official Test Deck..................................................................80  
6.6.1 Proposed MDOS Rule..............................................................................................80  
6.6.2 Issue(s) ..................................................................................................................82  
6.6.3 Proposed Revision ..................................................................................................83  
6.7  
R 168.777 Preliminary Accuracy Test ...........................................................................85  
6.7.1 Proposed MDOS Rule..............................................................................................85  
6.7.2 Issue(s) ..................................................................................................................85  
6.7.3 Proposed Revision ..................................................................................................85  
6.8  
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R 168.778 Public Accuracy Test ...................................................................................86  
August 16, 2024  
Evaluation of Proposed Electronic Voting System Rules  
By Patrick Colbeck  
6.8.1 Proposed MDOS Rule..............................................................................................86  
6.8.2 Issue(s) ..................................................................................................................87  
6.8.3 Proposed Revision ..................................................................................................88  
6.9  
R 168.779 Preparation and Delivery of Election Materials .............................................90  
6.9.1 Proposed MDOS Rule..............................................................................................90  
6.9.2 Issue(s) ..................................................................................................................91  
6.9.3 Proposed Revision ..................................................................................................91  
6.10 R 168.780 Clerks and Election Inspectors; Duties Before Opening of Polls ....................92  
6.10.1  
6.10.2  
6.10.3  
Proposed MDOS Rule..........................................................................................92  
Issue(s) ..............................................................................................................93  
Proposed Revision ..............................................................................................93  
6.11 R 168.781 Conduct of elections and manner of voting..................................................95  
6.11.1  
6.11.2  
6.11.3  
Proposed MDOS Rule..........................................................................................95  
Issue(s) ..............................................................................................................96  
Proposed Revision ..............................................................................................96  
6.12 R 168.782 Election Inspectors; Duties After Polls Are Closed........................................97  
6.13 R 168.784 Processing Write-In Ballots .........................................................................98  
6.14 R 168.785 Duplication of Ballots .................................................................................98  
6.15 R 168.786 Absentee Ballots; Issuance, Processing and Tabulation................................98  
6.16 R 168.788 Receiving Station; Receiving Board ..............................................................98  
6.17 R 168.789 Absent Voter Counting Board ......................................................................98  
6.17.1  
6.17.2  
6.17.3  
Proposed MDOS Rule..........................................................................................98  
Issue(s) ..............................................................................................................99  
Proposed Revision ..............................................................................................99  
6.18 R 168.790 Closing Procedures; Ballot Retention ........................................................100  
6.18.1  
6.18.2  
6.18.3  
Proposed MDOS Rule........................................................................................100  
Issue(s) ............................................................................................................102  
Proposed Revision ............................................................................................103  
6.19 R 168.791 Challengers..............................................................................................106  
6.19.1  
6.19.2  
6.19.3  
Proposed MDOS Rule........................................................................................106  
Issue(s) ............................................................................................................106  
Proposed Revision ............................................................................................106  
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Evaluation of Proposed Electronic Voting System Rules  
By Patrick Colbeck  
6.20 R 168.792 Canvass ...................................................................................................107  
6.20.1  
6.20.2  
6.20.3  
Proposed MDOS Rule........................................................................................107  
Issue(s) ............................................................................................................107  
Proposed Revisions...........................................................................................108  
6.21 R 168.793 Recount ...................................................................................................108  
6.21.1  
6.21.2  
6.21.3  
Proposed MDOS Rule........................................................................................108  
Issue(s) ............................................................................................................110  
Proposed Revision ............................................................................................110  
7
Proposed New Rules .........................................................................................................112  
7.1  
7.2  
R 168.775a Preparation of Accessible Voting Device ..................................................112  
R 168.780a Early Voting.............................................................................................112  
7.2.1 Proposed MDOS Rule............................................................................................112  
7.2.2 Issue(s) ................................................................................................................114  
7.2.3 Proposed Revision ................................................................................................114  
7.3  
[New] User Account Security.....................................................................................117  
7.3.1 Issue(s) ................................................................................................................117  
7.3.2 Proposed New Rule...............................................................................................117  
7.4  
[New] Network Connections .....................................................................................118  
7.4.1 Issue(s) ................................................................................................................118  
7.4.2 Proposed New Rule...............................................................................................120  
7.5  
[New] Election Night Reporting..................................................................................121  
7.5.1 Issue(s) ................................................................................................................121  
7.5.2 Proposed New Rule...............................................................................................121  
7.6  
[New] Software Configuration ...................................................................................122  
7.6.1 Issue(s) ................................................................................................................122  
7.6.2 Proposed New Rule...............................................................................................122  
7.7  
[New] Preservation of Digital and Physical Records....................................................122  
7.7.1 Issue(s) ................................................................................................................122  
7.7.2 Proposed New Rule...............................................................................................123  
Proposed Rule Deletions ...................................................................................................123  
8
8.1  
8.2  
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R 168.783 Hanging Chads .........................................................................................123  
R 168.787 Delegate to County Convention.................................................................123  
August 16, 2024  
Evaluation of Proposed Electronic Voting System Rules  
By Patrick Colbeck  
9
Findings............................................................................................................................123  
9.1  
Insufficient Rigor to Ensure Accuracy and Integrity of Elections ..................................124  
Bias Towards Diminishing Rights of Voters .................................................................124  
Continued Abuse of Rule-Making Process .................................................................125  
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................126  
9.2  
9.3  
10  
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August 16, 2024  
Evaluation of Proposed Electronic Voting System Rules  
By Patrick Colbeck  
1 Introduction  
The Michigan Constitution guarantees our citizens the right to an audit of statewide election results  
sufficient to ensure the accuracy and integrity of those results. It goes on to assert that this right is  
self-executing and should be liberally construed in favor of voters’ rights to effectuate its purpose.  
Clearly, it is incumbent upon the Michigan Secretary of State along with the Michigan Bureau of  
Elections to implement rules that comply with these important provisions of our Michigan  
Constitution. The enclosed report seeks to recalibrate the rules proposed by Michigan Secretary of  
State in order to comply with these provisions.  
2 Background  
On January 6, 2017, Election Infrastructure was designated by Department of Homeland Security  
Secretary Jeh Johnson as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector. This designation indicates that there  
needs to be a high degree of rigor applied to the security practices pertaining to the conduct of our  
elections. Upon issuing the designation, the federal government pursued the creation of an  
Election Integrity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC). The EI-ISAC is dedicated to  
monitoring threats to our election infrastructure.  
Figure 1DHS Press Release on Elections as Critical Infrastructure  
Electronic voting systems introduce unique security concerns when it comes to ensuring the  
accuracy and integrity of our elections. On July 28, 2020, the Federal Cybersecurity and  
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August 16, 2024  
   
Evaluation of Proposed Electronic Voting System Rules  
By Patrick Colbeck  
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released their Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience  
Note addressing some of these concerns. The note (aka report) features a framework for  
evaluating the cybersecurity risks posed to our election system. The critical components of this  
system are defined in Figure 2. For each of these components, CISA has evaluated the risks to  
voter confidence, election integrity, and availability as a result of compromises to their security.  
The consequences of these risks would be significant. Any rules pertaining to our electronic voting  
systems should therefore seek to prevent these consequences or at least mitigate their severity.  
Figure 2 CISA Election System Functional Ecosystem  
In October 2020, the Michigan Election Security Advisory Commission released their Report and  
Recommendations pertaining to election security (See Figure 3). Their recommendations included  
enhanced user account security protocols, expanded monitoring, enhanced Qualified Voter File  
(QVF) security, providing transparency, prohibiting connecting tabulators to the internet, phasing  
out “modeming in” of election night results, building redundancies into electronic reporting,  
observing best practices when using removable drives, enhanced vendor accountability and  
reporting, and prioritizing accuracy over speed when it comes to election night reporting.  
Figure 3 October MESC Report and Recommendation  
On July 31, 2024, LARA released a notice of public hearing regarding proposed rule changes by the  
Michigan Department of State governing electronic voting systems. The scope of the proposed rule  
changes features revisions to R 168.771, R 168.772, R 168.773, R 168.774, R 168.775, R 168.776, R  
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Evaluation of Proposed Electronic Voting System Rules  
By Patrick Colbeck  
168.777, R 168.778, R 168.779, R 168.780, R 168.781, R 168.782, R 168.784, R 168.785, R 168.786,  
R 168.788, R 168.789, R 168.790, R 168.791, R 168.792, and R 168.793 of the Michigan  
Administrative Code, addition of R 168.775a and R 168.780a, and deletion of R 168.783 and R  
168.787.  
These proposed changes merit serious examination. Do they address the security risks identified  
by CISA? Do they address the MESC recommendations? Do they comply with the law?  
This report is my attempt to answer these important questions. As the former Vice Chair of the  
Michigan Senate Elections and Government Reform Committee, I am very familiar with the  
statutory environment pertaining to elections and the obligations of the executive branch to  
conduct elections in accordance with these statutes. As a certified Microsoft Small Business  
Specialist, I am uniquely qualified to address concerns with the implementation and security of  
electronic voting systems. As a certified poll challenger in both the 2020 and 2022 elections, I am  
also equipped to address concerns as to how our elections are actually conducted in the field. I  
believe that most objective observers would agree that this background indicates the experience  
and expertise necessary to conduct such a professional review of the proposed rule changes for  
electronic voting systems.  
3 Governing Statutes  
Any rules issued by MDOS are subordinate to the Michigan Constitution and Michigan Compiled  
Law.  
3.1 Referenced Statutes  
The statutes within this section were referenced in the MDOS proposed rule revisions.  
3.1.1 MCL 168.31  
(1) The secretary of state shall do all of the following:  
(a) Subject to subsection (2), issue instructions and promulgate rules pursuant to the  
administrative procedures act of 1969, 1969 PA 306, MCL 24.201 to 24.328, for the conduct of  
elections and registrations in accordance with the laws of this state.  
(b) Advise and direct local election officials as to the proper methods of conducting elections.  
(c) Publish and furnish for the use in each election precinct before each state primary and  
election a manual of instructions that includes specific instructions on assisting voters in casting  
their ballots, directions on the location of voting stations in polling places, procedures and forms  
for processing challenges, and procedures on prohibiting campaigning in the polling places as  
prescribed in this act.  
(d) Publish indexed pamphlet copies of the registration, primary, and election laws and furnish to  
the various county, city, township, and village clerks a sufficient number of copies for their own use  
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and to enable them to include 1 copy with the election supplies furnished each precinct board of  
election inspectors under their respective jurisdictions. The secretary of state may furnish single  
copies of the publications to organizations or individuals who request the same for purposes of  
instruction or public reference.  
(e) Prescribe and require uniform forms, notices, and supplies the secretary of state considers  
advisable for use in the conduct of elections and registrations.  
(f) Prepare the form of ballot for any proposed amendment to the constitution or proposal under  
the initiative or referendum provision of the constitution to be submitted to the voters of this state.  
(g) Require reports from the local election officials the secretary of state considers necessary.  
(h) Investigate, or cause to be investigated by local authorities, the administration of election  
laws, and report violations of the election laws and regulations to the attorney general or  
prosecuting attorney, or both, for prosecution.  
(i) Publish in the legislative manual the vote for governor and secretary of state by townships and  
wards and the vote for members of the state legislature cast at the preceding November election,  
which shall be returned to the secretary of state by the county clerks on or before the first day of  
December following the election. All clerks shall furnish to the secretary of state, promptly and  
without compensation, any further information requested of them to be used in the compilation of  
the legislative manual.  
(j) Establish a curriculum for comprehensive training and accreditation of all county, city,  
township, and village officials who are responsible for conducting elections.  
(k) Establish a continuing election education program for all county, city, township, and village  
clerks.  
(l) Establish and require attendance by all new appointed or elected election officials at an initial  
course of instruction within 6 months before the date of the election.  
(m) Establish a comprehensive training curriculum for all precinct inspectors.  
(n) Create an election day dispute resolution team that has regional representatives of the  
department of state, which team shall appear on site, if necessary.  
(2) Pursuant to the administrative procedures act of 1969, 1969 PA 306, MCL 24.201 to 24.328,  
the secretary of state shall promulgate rules establishing uniform standards for state and local  
nominating, recall, and ballot question petition signatures. The standards for petition signatures  
may include, but need not be limited to, standards for all of the following:  
(a) Determining the validity of registration of a circulator or individual signing a petition.  
(b) Determining the genuineness of the signature of a circulator or individual signing a petition,  
including digitized signatures.  
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(c) Proper designation of the place of registration of a circulator or individual signing a petition.  
3.1.2 MCL 168.37  
(1) The secretary of state shall select a uniform voting system under the provisions of this section.  
The secretary of state shall convene an advisory committee on the selection of the uniform voting  
system, whose membership represents county, city, and township election officials and other  
relevant organizations. In addition, the speaker and minority leader of the house of representatives  
and the majority and minority leaders of the senate may each appoint 1 advisory committee  
member.  
(2) The secretary of state may conduct tests of a voting system in order to select the uniform  
voting system. The secretary of state shall not consider a voting system for selection as the uniform  
voting system unless the voting system is approved and certified as provided in section 795a. At the  
secretary of state's request, the board of state canvassers shall perform the approval and  
certification review, as provided in section 795a, of a voting system that the secretary of state wants  
to consider for selection as the uniform voting system.  
(3) When the uniform voting system is selected or at an earlier time that the secretary of state  
considers advisable, the secretary of state shall notify each county, city, and township about the  
selection or impending selection of the uniform voting system. A governmental unit that is notified  
under this subsection shall not purchase or enter into a contract to purchase a voting system other  
than the uniform voting system after receipt of the notice.  
(4) After selection of the uniform voting system, the secretary of state shall establish a schedule  
for acquisition and implementation of the uniform voting system throughout this state. The  
secretary of state may devise a schedule that institutes the uniform voting system over several  
election cycles. The secretary of state shall widely publicize the schedule and changes to the  
schedule. If, however, a jurisdiction has acquired a new voting system within 8 years before the  
jurisdiction receives notice from the secretary of state under subsection (3), that jurisdiction is not  
required to acquire and use the uniform voting system until the expiration of 10 years after the date  
of the original purchase of the equipment.  
(5) If, after selection of the uniform voting system, the secretary of state determines that the  
uniform voting system no longer serves the welfare of the voters or has become out of date in  
regards to voting system technology, the secretary of state may repeat the process for selecting the  
uniform voting system authorized under this section.  
(6) This section does not apply until money is appropriated for the purpose of selecting, acquiring,  
and implementing the uniform voting system. If federal money becomes available for the purposes  
described in this section, the secretary of state shall, and the legislature intends to, take the steps  
necessary to qualify for and appropriate that money for the purposes described in this section.  
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3.1.3 MCL 168.794  
(1) Subject to this section, the board of commissioners of a county, the legislative body of a city or  
village, the township board of a township, or the school board of a school district, by a majority  
vote, may authorize, acquire by purchase, lease, or otherwise, adopt, experiment with, or abandon  
an electronic voting system approved for use in this state in an election, and may use the system in  
all or a part of the precincts within its boundaries, or in combination with other approved voting  
systems.  
(2) A new electronic voting system shall not be used at a general election in a county, city, or  
township unless, in addition to the other requirements of this act, all of the following requirements  
are met:  
(a) The county, city, or township purchases or otherwise acquires the electronic voting system 6  
months or more before the next general election to be held in that county, city, or township.  
(b) The county, city, or township uses the electronic voting system at a primary, special, or other  
local election held in the county, city, or township before the general election.  
(3) The appropriate board of election commissioners shall provide for an accuracy test of an  
electronic voting system in the manner prescribed in rules promulgated by the secretary of state.  
The secretary of state shall prescribe procedures for preparing test decks and conducting accuracy  
tests for electronic voting systems in this state.  
(4) Before an election held in a county, city, township, village, or school district, the secretary of  
state may randomly select and test for accuracy an electronic voting system to be used by the  
county, city, township, village, or school district in that election. The secretary of state shall use the  
test decks prepared by the secretary of state to conduct the random tests allowed under this  
subsection.  
(5) A board of election commissioners shall not use in an election an electronic voting system  
that has failed the most recent accuracy test performed on that voting system under this act. An  
electronic voting system may be used after any necessary corrections are made and an accuracy  
test is passed on the system.  
(6) Subsection (1) does not apply to a county, city, village, township, or school district after the  
county, city, village, township, or school district receives the secretary of state's notice under  
section 37. Subsection (2) shall apply to a county, city, village, township, or school district after it  
receives the secretary of state's notice under section 37 if, at the time of the notice, the county, city,  
village, township, or school district is using an electronic voting system that is the same type as the  
uniform voting system.  
3.1.4 MCL 168.794c  
Sec. 794c.  
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The provisions of sections 794 to 799a control with respect to elections where electronic voting  
systems are used, and shall be liberally construed so as to carry out the purpose of the provisions.  
A provision of law relating to the conduct of elections that conflicts with sections 794 to 799a does  
not apply to the conduct of elections with an approved electronic voting system. The secretary of  
state shall promulgate rules to implement the provisions of sections 794 to 799a, in accordance  
with the administrative procedures act of 1969, Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, being  
sections 24.201 to 24.328 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.  
3.1.5 MCL 168.797b  
Sec. 797b.  
The secretary of state shall promulgate rules pursuant to the administrative procedures act of  
1969, Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, being sections 24.201 to 24.328 of the Michigan  
Compiled Laws, governing the tabulation of ballots, certification of results, delivery of ballots and  
certified results, and sealing of devices and ballot boxes after the polls are closed.  
3.1.6 MCL 168.720c  
(4) The secretary of state shall provide guidance to county and municipal election officials  
regarding the process for securing equipment and ballots at the conclusion of each day of early  
voting.  
(5) The secretary of state shall issue instructions regarding ballots produced by an on-demand  
ballot printing system and that are subject to challenge.  
3.2 Additional Applicable Statutes  
The following laws were not referenced in the MDOS proposed rules but compliance with them is as  
significant as compliance with the laws that were referenced.  
•
•
•
United States Code Title 52  
MI Constitution Article II Section 4  
Michigan Compiled Law  
o
Administrative Procedures Act  
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
MCL 24.242  
MCL 24.244  
MCL 24.245  
MCL 24.245a  
MCL 168.765  
MCL 168.794  
MCL 168.795  
MCL 168.812  
MCL 168.813  
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4 Rule Adoption Timeline  
All rules must go through the listed process which includes departmental review, public hearing,  
referral to JCAR, and filing with the secretary of state. This means that the rules cannot be filed with  
the secretary of state until they have gone through the whole process. This process is described in  
Figure 4.  
Once the public hearing on August 16, 2024 has been completed, the rules can then be referred to  
JCAR Committee. After 15 joint session days (i.e. both the house and senate in session with a  
quorum), the rules are filed with the Secretary of State and enacted. The department (bureau of  
elections) can request that JCAR waive the remaining session days. The chair of JCAR then has to  
agree, holding a committee hearing, and vote with a majority to waive the remaining days. In light of  
the number of likely joint session days before the November 5, 2024 general election, we anticipate  
an attempt to expedite the enactment of these rules.  
There are additional considerations pertinent to the rule adoption timeline including programming,  
ballot printing and ballot mailing timelines. This begs the question why these proposed rule  
changes were delayed in such a manner that would likely lead to timeline conflicts for these  
important election preparation activities.  
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Figure 4 https://www.michigan.gov/lara/-  
/media/Project/Websites/lara/moahr/ARD/Education/Rulemaking_Process_Summary.pdf?rev=7450cb60e46f45b69bc4d  
4b4edd8f796&hash=7EF8B9900A5F36281031A8AE68F2A4D7  
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5 Key Definitions  
5.1 Election Equipment  
(k) “Election equipment” means equipment used in administering elections, including, but not  
limited to, a voting machine, voting device, or voting system.  
5.2 Election Management System  
(l) “Election management system” means a system that has been approved by the board of state  
canvassers to produce a program and produce results.  
5.3 Program  
(q) “Program” means the operating instructions for a voting system by which it examines, counts,  
tabulates, and produces the results of the votes cast on a ballot.  
5.4 Qualified Voter File  
(r) “Qualified voter file” means the official file of voters for the conduct of all elections held in this  
state as described in section 509o of the act, MCL 168.509o.  
5.5 Tabulator  
(w) “Tabulator” means automatic tabulating equipment that scans and accumulates results.  
5.6 Voting Station  
(y) “Voting station” or “voting booth” means a unit containing an accessible voting device or a  
surface that allows the voter to mark the ballot that provides privacy and blocks an individual’s view  
on not less than 3 sides.  
6 Issues with Proposed MDOS Rule Changes  
This section reviews each of the proposed rule changes, highlights any issues with the proposed  
changes, and provides recommended revisions to the proposed rules or new rules as applicable.  
6.1 R 168.771 Definitions  
6.1.1 Ballot  
6.1.1.1 Proposed MDOS Rule  
(e) “Ballot” means an approved paper form or a medium through which votes are recorded that is  
produced as a paper form.  
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6.1.1.2 Issue(s)  
Ballots have multiple states – Pre-Cast, Cast and Ballot Image. It is important to differentiate  
between each state as differentiating between these states is an important element of any  
professional audit of election results. Before they cast their vote, voters are handed a pre-cast  
ballot that includes a perforated seam that separates the section containing the ballot ID tracked in  
pollbooks (i.e. ballot stub) from the section of the ballot capturing voter intent for each ballot  
measure. Before a ballot is scanned and tabulated, the ballot stub is removed from the ballot  
making it impossible to connect an individual voter with the cast ballot. When the ballot stub is  
removed, the ballot is referred to as a cast ballot. Cast ballots are converted to ballot images by  
scanners. Scanners transfer these ballot images to tabulators. Ballot images are what tabulators  
read to determine voter intent during tabulation of votes, yet there are no references to ballot  
images in the proposed rule set. The rules also lack any reference to cast vote records which log  
such tabulation activities. As such, pre-cast ballots, cast ballots, ballot stubs, ballot images and  
cast vote records are critical components of the election record chain of custody and necessary for  
the conduct of any professional audit of election results.  
6.1.1.3 Proposed New Rules  
(e) “Pre-Cast Ballot” means an approved paper form or a medium through which votes are  
recorded that is produced as a paper form and includes an attached ballot stub indicating a unique  
ballot id.  
(cc) “Cast Ballot” means an approved paper form or a medium through which votes are recorded  
that is produced as a paper form and has been separated from the ballot stub indicating a unique  
ballot id.  
(dd) “Ballot Stub” means the perforated paper stub containing a unique ballot id that is separated  
from a cast ballot.  
(ee) “Cast Vote Records” means a log of tabulation activities including the following information as  
a minimum: Municipality, precinct, tabulator ID, ballot sequence id or batch id, ballot type ID,  
number of ballots in batch, beginning timestamp, end timestamp, ballot status, contest, contest  
vote tally, ballot or batch status.  
(ff) “Ballot” means either a Pre-Cast Ballot or Cast Ballot when not specifically delimited as such.  
6.1.2 Status Report  
6.1.2.1 Proposed MDOS Rule  
(v) “Status report” means a report generated from each tabulator or other election equipment at  
the close of each day of early voting.  
6.1.2.2 Issue(s)  
There is insufficient clarity as to the contents of the status report. Without such clarity, it is  
impossible to discern if the report would contain data sufficient to support a professional audit of  
election records.  
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6.1.2.3 Proposed Revision  
(v) “Status report” means a report generated from each tabulator or other election equipment at  
the close of each day of early voting or on election day that includes the following information as a  
minimum: machine ID, election, timedate stamp, user account printing status report, machine  
model, software version, software installation date, machine serial number, and for each precinct  
the total scanned votes and total voters.  
6.1.3 Totals Tape  
6.1.3.1 Proposed MDOS Rule  
(x) “Totals tape” or “results report” or “summary totals tape” means a report generated from each  
tabulator or other election equipment after the close of polls on election day.  
6.1.3.2 Issue(s)  
There is insufficient clarity as to the contents of the totals tape. Without such clarity, it is  
impossible to discern if the tape would contain data sufficient to support a professional audit of  
election records.  
6.1.3.3 Proposed Revision  
(x) “Totals tape” or “results report” or “summary totals tape” means a report generated from each  
tabulator or other election equipment after the close of polls on election day. that includes the  
following information as a minimum: machine ID, election, timedate stamp, user account printing  
status report, machine model, software version, software installation date, machine serial number,  
and, for each precinct, the total scanned votes, and total voters plus the following information for  
each ballot measure for each precinct: the total votes, number of overvotes, and number of  
undervotes.  
6.1.4 Voting System  
6.1.4.1 Proposed MDOS Rule  
(z) “Voting system” means 1 or more pieces of automatic tabulating equipment that examines,  
tabulates, and counts votes recorded on ballots and produces results, as specified in sections 37  
and 794a of the act, MCL 168.37 and 168.794a.  
6.1.4.2 Issue(s)  
MCL 168.37 and MCL 168.794a refer to the electronic voting systems procured by the State of  
Michigan. The proposed MDOS rules appear to be constraining the definition of voting system so  
that it does not include all of the components featured in electronic voting system contracts with  
the State of Michigan. Per the Dominion Voting Systems contract with the State of Michigan, a  
voting system includes: tabulators, accessible voting system components, election event designer,  
mobile ballot printing, results transmission, election night reporting, results tally and reporting,  
networking equipment and Election Management System (EMS) software plus all of the hardware  
and software needed to satisfy voting system hardware, voting system election management  
system software, absentee voting, and accessible voting system component technical  
requirements.  
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Figure 5 Pages 26-27 of Contract 071B7700117 between Dominion and State of Michigan  
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Figure 6 Pages 27-28 of Contract 071B7700117 between Dominion and State of Michigan  
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Figure 7 Page 76 of Contract 071B7700117 between Dominion and State of Michigan  
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Figure 8 Page 114 of Contract 071B7700117 between Dominion and State of Michigan  
6.1.4.3 Proposed Revision  
(z) “Voting system” means all hardware and software components necessary to program election  
artifacts, print ballots, tabulate ballots, report election results and transfer election results as  
referenced electronic voting system contracts pertaining to sections 37 and 794a of the act, MCL  
168.37 and 168.794a.  
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6.1.5 Pollbook References  
6.1.5.1 Proposed MDOS Rules  
(n) “Electronic pollbook” means computer software that receives information from the qualified  
voter file and is used during elections to process voters and generate reports.  
(p) “Physical pollbook” means a paper pollbook in which the election inspectors in a precinct or  
early voting site shall enter, in the order in which electors are given ballots, the name of each  
elector who is given a ballot.  
6.1.5.2 Issue(s)  
Electronic Pollbook, Physical Pollbook, Pollbook are all used throughout proposed rules. The  
proposed definitions are incomplete as they do not include all functions of a poll book notably the  
capture of poll challenger information and other notes regarding the conduct of elections that  
would be useful for canvassers evaluating the conduct of an election. Furthermore, the definition  
uses the term “precinct” to refer to polling location in what appears to be an effort to distinguish a  
polling location from an early voting site. Precincts are a common jurisdictional voter attribute  
across polling locations, early voting sites and absent voter counting boards (which were not  
referenced in definitions). Therefore, regardless of where used, pollbooks (be they electronic or  
physical) feature precinct-specific voter data used by election inspectors at polling locations, early  
voting sites and absent voter counting boards.  
6.1.5.3 Proposed Revision  
(n) “Electronic pollbook” means hardware and software that receives qualified voter information  
from the state qualified voter file and is used by election inspectors to track precinct-specific  
allocation of ballots to voters, capture challenges, capture other notes, and generate reports based  
upon this information that would assist canvassers in the execution of their duties.  
(p) “Physical pollbook” means a paper pollbook reflecting a printed extract of the state qualified  
voter file and is used by election inspectors to track precinct-specific allocation of ballots to voters,  
capture challenges, and capture other notes that would assist canvassers in the execution of their  
duties.  
(bb) “Pollbook” refers to either electronic or physical pollbooks. All pollbooks shall contain the  
following information as a minimum: voter name, voter signature, voter birthdate, voter address,  
voter driver’s license number, voting status flags, ballot number issued to voter, and challenges.  
6.1.6 Election Materials  
6.1.6.1 Proposed MDOS Rule  
(m) “Election materials” mean materials used in administering elections, including, but not  
limited to, ballots, physical pollbooks, and other materials described in section 811 of the act, MCL  
168.811. Election materials do not include ballot stubs.  
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6.1.6.2 Issue(s)  
Under Title 52 Section 20701 of the United States Code, ALL records and papers relating to any act  
requisite to voting shall be preserved for a period on not less than 22 months from the date of any  
election featuring federal candidates. ALL records means digital as well as physical records yet  
there is no reference to digital artifacts in the proposed definition of election materials.  
Furthermore, ballot stubs are critical elements of any professional audit of elections as they  
indicate the ballot ID’s for all ballots cast in a given precinct. These ID’s can be cross-referenced  
with pollbook data to ensure that only those ballots approved by poll workers using pollbook  
records are stored in the ballot container(s) for that precinct.  
6.1.6.3 Proposed Revision  
(m) “Election materials” means all digital and physical records used in administering elections,  
including, but not limited to, ballots, ballot images, cast vote records, physical pollbooks,  
electronic pollbooks, databases, programs, flash drives, digital transaction logs, digital event logs  
and other materials described in section 811 of the act, MCL 168.811.  
6.1.7 Summary Zero Report  
6.1.7.1 Proposed MDOS Rule  
(aa) “Zero tape” or “zero report” or “summary zero report” means a report generated from a  
tabulator or other election equipment that shows that no results have been accumulated before  
the tabulation of ballots.  
6.1.7.2 Issue(s)  
There is insufficient clarity as to the contents of the summary zero report. Without such clarity, it is  
impossible to discern if the report would contain data sufficient to support a professional audit of  
election records.  
6.1.7.3 [New Rule] Summary Zero Report  
(x) “Zero tape” or “zero report” or “summary zero report” means a report generated from each  
tabulator or other election equipment to show how many votes have been accumulated before the  
tabulation of ballots that includes the following information as a minimum: machine ID, election,  
timedate stamp, user account printing status report, machine model, software version, software  
installation date, machine serial number, and, for each precinct, the total scanned votes, and total  
voters plus the following information for each ballot measure for each precinct: the total votes,  
number of overvotes, and number of undervotes.  
6.1.8 Ballot Summary Page  
6.1.8.1 Issue(s)  
Ballot Summary Page is referenced in multiple sections of proposed rules (Rule 168.780a(1)(d)(i),  
Rule 168.780a(1)(d)(v), Rule 168.780a(2)(b)(ii), Rule 168.780a(2)(c)(ii), and Rule 168.782(3)) yet  
there is no definition of the contents of a Ballot Summary Page.  
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On-demand ballot printing is now a standard feature of most early voting centers. In support of a  
professional audit evaluating the accuracy and integrity of a given election, the number of ballots  
printed in this manner must be tracked and reflected in official election records.  
6.1.8.2 [New Rule] Ballot Summary Page  
(ff) “Ballot Summary Page” means a section of the Statement of Votes that includes the following  
information for a specific precinct, jurisdiction and election date: Number of official ballots  
delivered to precinct for each ballot style, the starting number for ballots delivered to precinct,  
number of absent voter return envelopes received by board, number of ballots tabulated, number  
of absent voter ballot envelopes delivered to precinct which did not contain a ballot, number of  
ballots reissued to voters who spoiled their ballot at the polling place, number of ballots used by  
election inspectors for ballot duplication, number of on-demand ballots printed, number of  
provisional ballots, and number of unused ballots.  
6.1.9 Adjudication Equipment  
6.1.9.1 Issue(s)  
Adjudication equipment that is used to review scanned ballot images so as to determine voter  
intent is a key element of the vote tally chain of custody yet is not referred to at all in the proposed  
new rules.  
6.1.9.2 [New] Adjudication Equipment  
(gg) “Adjudicating equipment” means all hardware and software components necessary to  
adjudicate voter intent via review of ballot images and adjust tabulated results from these images  
accordingly.  
6.1.10  
Vote Tally Equipment  
6.1.10.1 Issue(s)  
While tabulators are the starting points in the vote tally chain of custody, they are often not the  
devices which produce the official election results. In Detroit, for example, the official election  
results are produced by their Dominion Election Management System (EMS) Server. This server in  
turn receives data from Dominion ImageCast Precinct tabulators at each polling location and the  
Results and Tally Reporting (RTR) Server residing at their Absent Voter Counting Board. The RTR  
server in turn aggregates the vote tallies across all Dominion ImageCast Central tabulators and  
Adjudicator Workstations at the Absent Voter Counting Board.  
6.1.10.2 [New] Vote Tally Equipment  
(hh) “Vote Tally Equipment” means all hardware and software components necessary to merge  
vote tally data from one or more tabulators and/or adjudicators.  
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6.1.11  
Networking Equipment  
6.1.11.1 Issue(s)  
Networking equipment plays a central role in the transfer of digital election records. Seals and logs  
are associated with physical election records and election equipment, however, digital records are  
not secured with similar rigor.  
6.1.11.2 [New] Networking Equipment  
(ii) “Networking Equipment” means all hardware and software components necessary to transfer  
digital election record data from one storage device to another storage device.  
6.1.12  
Election Night Reporting  
6.1.12.1 Issue(s)  
Election Night Reporting (ENR) is a component of the contracts for all of Michigan’s electronic  
voting system vendors. ENR is arguably the most important component of the election process to  
candidates and voters alike is that of Election Night Reporting. The proposed rules, however, make  
zero mention of election night reporting.  
6.1.12.2 [New] Election Night Reporting  
(ii) “Election Night Reporting” pertains to the transfer of vote tally election records from vote tally  
equipment to the general public, media and other stakeholders.  
6.1.13  
Audit  
6.1.13.1 Issue(s)  
The Michigan Constitution guarantees citizens the right to an audit of statewide election results.  
The MI Secretary of State has attempted to use Risk-Limiting Audits (RLA) to satisfy this provision of  
our constitution despite RLA’s focus upon recounting a select number of ballots. RLA’s are not of  
sufficient rigor to satisfy the constitutional requirement for audits that ensure the accuracy and  
integrity of our elections. Furthermore, all rights conferred under this provision of our Constitution  
are to be liberally construed in favor of voter rights.  
6.1.13.2 [New] Audit  
(jj) “Audit” is an independent examination and thorough review of pre-election, absentee voting,  
early voting, and election day records to determine if procedures were properly followed according  
to the Constitution, state statute, governing regulations, and established procedures.  
6.1.14  
Electronic Pollbook Activity Log Report  
6.1.14.1 Issue(s)  
Electronic pollbooks are used to conduct of election operations. Every activity captured in the  
electronic pollbook becomes part of the election audit trail which must be preserved.  
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6.1.14.2 [New] Electronic Pollbook Activity Log Report  
(kk) “Electronic pollbook activity log report” is a record of all activities pertaining to the conduct of  
an election that were recorded on an electronic pollbook. It is a key component of an election audit  
trail.  
6.1.15  
Electronic Pollbook Remarks Report  
6.1.15.1 Issue(s)  
Electronic pollbooks are used to capture remarks regarding the conduct of election operations. All  
poll workers are instructed as to what remarks should be recorded in electronic pollbooks.  
6.1.15.2 [New] Electronic Pollbook Remarks Report  
(ll) “Electronic pollbook remarks report” is a record of all remarks entered by an election worker  
during the conduct of an election that were recorded on an electronic pollbook. It is a key  
component of an election audit trail.  
6.1.16  
Electronic Pollbook Voter List Report  
6.1.16.1 Issue(s)  
Electronic pollbooks are used to track which eligible voters have been allocated a ballot. The  
subsequent list of voters for a given election is a key component of the election audit trail.  
6.1.16.2 [New] Electronic Pollbook Voter List Report  
(mm) “Electronic pollbook voter list report” is a record of all voters who were issued a ballot  
during an election. It is a key component of an election audit trail.  
6.2 R 168.772 General Provisions  
6.2.1 Proposed MDOS Rule  
Rule 2. (1) The paper ballot procedures in the act are shall be applicable in elections in which  
electronic voting systems are used, except where superseded by specific provisions of the act or  
these rules.  
(2) A precinct in which electronic voting systems are used shall not contain more than the number  
of registered voters allowed permitted by the act in a precinct using voting machines.  
(3) Where the board of county commissioners provides for the purchase and use of an electronic  
voting system in a county, the county clerk shall have custody of the devices and beis responsible  
for their maintenance, repair, and preparation for elections.  
(4) Where the legislative body of a city, or township, or village provides for the purchase and use  
of an electronic voting system, the clerk of the city, or township, or village shall have custody of  
the devices and beis responsible for their maintenance, repair, and preparation for elections.  
(5) If a county owns the voting devices and the election is an election at which state or county  
offices or proposals are to be voted upon, or an election at which state, county, and local offices  
are to be voted upon, the county election commission shall provide programming and computer  
time and furnish the necessary supplies, including printing. Notwithstanding subrules (3) and  
(4) of this rule, maintenance, repair, and preparation of election equipment used in early  
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voting must be conducted in accordance with applicable county or municipal early voting  
agreements.  
(6) If a county owns the voting devices and the election is an election at which only local offices  
and proposals are to be voted upon, the county election commission shall provide programming  
and computer time and furnish the necessary supplies, including printing, and the local unit shall  
reimburse the county for the costs of the supplies; or the local unit may agree with the county that  
the local unit shall perform the functions required by this rule to be performed by the county.  
(7) If a city or township owns the voting devices and the election is an election at which state or  
county offices or proposals are to be voted upon, or an election at which state, county, and local  
offices and proposals are to be voted upon, the city election commission shall provide the devices,  
programming, and computer time, and the county election commission shall provide ballot cards,  
ballot envelopes, and the printing of the ballot labels. A city or township and a county may enter  
into a mutual agreement that the county shall provide programming or computer time, or both.  
(8) If a city or township owns the voting devices and the election is an election at which only  
local offices and proposals are to be voted upon, the city or township election commission shall  
provide the devices, programming, computer time, ballot cards, ballot envelopes, and the printing  
of ballot labels. A city or township and a county may enter into a mutual agreement that the county  
shall provide programming or computer time, or both.  
(9) A village or school district may contract with a city, county, or township for the use of voting  
devices, programming, and computer time.  
(106) Notwithstanding any other another provision of these rules, the election commissions of  
local units of government may enter into a mutual agreement for the joint use of a program and  
computer. The agreement shall state which the local unit units shall own has control of the  
programs and computer election management system. An agreement may be made with the  
county election commission stating and the control of the program and computer election  
management system shall be is vested in the county clerk. The county clerk or the county  
clerk's designee shall program the election management system and election equipment.  
(11) For the purpose of these rules, when a school election is conducted and the school district is  
supplying the program, the term “election commission” means the secretary and president of the  
school board and the superintendent of the school district.  
6.2.2 Issue(s)  
6.2.2.1 Compliance Measures Lacking  
A precinct in which electronic voting systems are used shall not contain more than the number of  
registered voters allowed by the act in a precinct, yet there is insufficient information available to  
election observers to confirm compliance with this provision particularly in communities with AV  
Counting Boards covering multiple precincts.  
6.2.2.2 Local Units of Government Contract Conflicts  
If local units of government purchase an electronic voting system, local clerks have custody of  
electronic voting system and are responsible for their maintenance, repair, and preparation for  
elections however, due to illusory provisions within the state contracts with electronic voting  
system vendors, they are not provided with the authority to engage vendors which they trust in the  
fulfillment of these responsibilities.  
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6.2.2.3 County Contract Conflicts  
If the county commissioners purchase an electronic voting system, local units of government own  
the programs and election management system, but the County Clerk is explicitly granted control  
over the program and election management system however, due to illusory provisions within the  
state contracts with electronic voting system vendors, they are not provided with the authority to  
engage vendors which they trust in the fulfillment of these responsibilities.  
6.2.3 Proposed Revision  
Rule 2. (1) The paper ballot procedures in the act are shall be applicable in elections in which  
electronic voting systems are used, except where superseded by specific provisions of the act or  
these rules.  
(2) A precinct in which electronic voting systems are used shall not contain more than the number  
of registered voters allowed permitted by the act in a precinct using voting machines. Polling  
locations, early voting sites, and Counting Boards within an Absent Voter Counting Board facility  
must provide a public display during the election period of the number of the number of registered  
voters for each precinct represented as specified in MCL 168.658.  
(3) Where the board of county commissioners provides for the purchase and use of an electronic  
voting system in a county, the county clerk shall have custody of the devices and beis responsible  
for their maintenance, repair, and preparation for elections regardless of any illusory provisions  
contained in contracts between units of government and electronic voting system vendors  
preventing such activities at the discretion of county officials.  
(4) Where the legislative body of a city, or township, or village provides for the purchase and use  
of an electronic voting system, the clerk of the city, or township, or village shall have custody of  
the devices and beis responsible for their maintenance, repair, and preparation for elections  
regardless of any illusory provisions contained in contracts between units of government and  
electronic voting system vendors preventing such activities at the discretion of county officials.  
(5) If a county owns the voting devices and the election is an election at which state or county  
offices or proposals are to be voted upon, or an election at which state, county, and local offices  
are to be voted upon, the county election commission shall provide programming and computer  
time and furnish the necessary supplies, including printing. Notwithstanding subrules (3) and  
(4) of this rule, maintenance, repair, and preparation of election equipment used in early  
voting must be conducted in accordance with applicable county or municipal early voting  
agreements.  
(6) If a county owns the voting devices and the election is an election at which only local offices  
and proposals are to be voted upon, the county election commission shall provide programming  
and computer time and furnish the necessary supplies, including printing, and the local unit shall  
reimburse the county for the costs of the supplies; or the local unit may agree with the county that  
the local unit shall perform the functions required by this rule to be performed by the county.  
(7) If a city or township owns the voting devices and the election is an election at which state or  
county offices or proposals are to be voted upon, or an election at which state, county, and local  
offices and proposals are to be voted upon, the city election commission shall provide the devices,  
programming, and computer time, and the county election commission shall provide ballot cards,  
ballot envelopes, and the printing of the ballot labels. A city or township and a county may enter  
into a mutual agreement that the county shall provide programming or computer time, or both.  
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(8) If a city or township owns the voting devices and the election is an election at which only  
local offices and proposals are to be voted upon, the city or township election commission shall  
provide the devices, programming, computer time, ballot cards, ballot envelopes, and the printing  
of ballot labels. A city or township and a county may enter into a mutual agreement that the county  
shall provide programming or computer time, or both.  
(9) A village or school district may contract with a city, county, or township for the use of voting  
devices, programming, and computer time.  
(106) Notwithstanding any other another provision of these rules, the election commissions of  
local units of government may enter into a mutual agreement for the joint use of a program and  
computer. The agreement shall state which the local unit units shall own has control of the  
programs and computer election management system. An agreement may be made with the  
county election commission stating and the control of the program and computer election  
management system shall be is vested in the county clerk. The county clerk or the county  
clerk's designee shall program the election management system and election equipment.  
(11) For the purpose of these rules, when a school election is conducted and the school district is  
supplying the program, the term “election commission” means the secretary and president of the  
school board and the superintendent of the school district.  
6.3 R 168.773 Preparation of Program  
6.3.1 Proposed MDOS Rule  
Rule 3. (1) A program shall must be written so as to accurately tabulate a voter’s choices for each  
candidate, office, and measure for which the voter is lawfully entitled to vote, in conformity with  
the act and these rules.  
(2) A program shall include an instruction requiring that 2 identical header cards precede the deck  
of ballot cards for each precinct. The program shall provide that if 2 identical header cards do not  
appear in front of the ballot cards of a precinct, the counting of ballots for that precinct shall not  
take place. In programs to be used on a specialized computer, 1 header card is required, unless the  
function of the header card is performed by the program.  
(3) An end card shall follow the ballots of each precinct. The program may provide that if a  
header card contains instructions to the computer that all ballots of the preceding precinct have  
been counted, a separate end card is not required. In a program to be used in a specialized computer,  
an end card is not required.  
(4) A program may be maintained by a generally accepted method, within the computer industry,  
of input or output or a combination of methods.  
(5) Two edit listings shall be prepared and, not less than 3 days before the preliminary accuracy  
test, shall be delivered to the election commission responsible for supplying the program.  
(62) The election commission responsible for supplying the program the election shall provide  
necessary information to the person or company designated county clerk to write or prepare the  
program.  
(73) The program for an election and a duplicate copy shall must be completed and delivered  
provided to the election commission responsible for supplying the program not less than 3 days  
before the election in a timely manner to allow for the preliminary accuracy test. A duplicate is  
not required where a specialized computer is used.  
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(8) If a program is written to be used on a general purpose computer, the person or company  
providing the program shall, at the time the program is delivered, submit to the election  
commission a certificate stating that the program was prepared from all relevant input data,  
describing the procedures which were used to determine its accuracy, and stating that the program  
has been written pursuant to the act and these rules.  
(9) The person preparing the program shall submit to the election commission responsible for  
supplying the program instructions containing the information and procedures required to operate  
the program. The election commission shall make the instructions available to the computer  
operators.  
(104) The vote tabulation portion of the program shall must be written as follows:  
(a) To reflect the rotation sequence of the candidates’ names and ballot position numbers as they  
appear on the ballot labels in the various precincts.  
(b) To count valid votes cast by a voter for candidates for an office.  
(c) To count valid votes cast by a voter for or against a any question proposal.  
(d) So as not to count votes cast by a voter for an office or question if the number of votes cast  
by a voter exceeds the number which that the voter is entitled to vote for on that office or question  
proposal.  
(e) To ignore punches marks in on a ballot card in positions where a candidate’s name or  
questions do not appear on the official ballot outside the target area. These punches marks must  
shall not have an effect on the ballot.  
(f) So that the partisan, nonpartisan, and proposal sections of the ballot are considered separate  
sections of the ballot. The action of a voter in 1 section of the ballot shall does not affect the voter’s  
action on another section of the ballot.  
(115) In addition to applicable requirements under subrule (4) of this rule, Ffor a partisan  
primary election, the vote tabulation section of the program shall must be written as follows:  
(a) To determine if a voter has cast votes for candidates of more than 1 political party.  
(b) To determine if a voter has cast votes for a candidate of 1 or more political parties and a vote  
in the “party qualification section” of the ballot.  
(ca) To count the votes when they are recorded by a voter for candidates of 1 political party,  
only where a vote is not recorded in the “party qualification section” of the ballot; or to count the  
vote when it is recorded by the voter for 1 selection only in the “party qualification section” of the  
ballot and where a vote is not recorded for 1 or more partisan candidates, as in examples 1, 2, 3,  
and 4 as in example 1.  
(b) To reject all votes cast in the partisan section of the ballot if votes are cast for candidates  
of more than 1 political party, as in example 2.  
Example 1: Count a vote for candidates A and D C.  
Example 2: Count a vote for candidates F and G no votes.  
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Example 1:  
Example 2:  
Example 3: Count a vote for party 4.  
Example 4: Count a vote for candidate D.  
Figure for 168.773 (1-2)  
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Figure for 168.773 (3-4)  
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(d) To reject all votes cast in the partisan section of the ballot and the “party qualification section”  
of the ballot if votes are cast for candidates of more than 1 political party; or if votes are cast for  
candidates of 1 or more political parties and 1 or more votes are cast in the “party qualification  
section” of the ballot; or if more than 1 vote is cast in the “party qualification section” of the ballot,  
as in examples 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.  
Example 5: Count no votes.  
Example 6: Count no votes.  
Example 7: Count no votes.  
Example 8: Count no votes.  
Example 9. Count no votes.  
Figure for 168.773 (5-7)  
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Figure for 168.773 (8-9)  
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(126) In addition to applicable requirements under subrule (4) of this rule, F for a partisan  
general election, the vote tabulation section of the program shall must be written as follows:  
(a) A vote must shall be counted for each candidate of the political party indicated by the voter’s  
straight ticket vote, if any other another vote does not appear on the partisan portion of the ballot,  
as in example 103.  
Figure for 168.773 (10-11)  
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